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argues against, on the grounds of his immense reliance on Western orthodoxy to
universalize African humanist thoughts.
No doubt, Left Universalism, Africacentric Essays is a timely, multivocal intervention
that opens up a wide range of issues that cuts across disciplines. The interdisciplinary
approach and vast intertextual references make the book an invaluable asset. It would
serve as a great introductory text on methodology for drawing on a wide range of disci-
plines to create a niche and multiple sites of contestations for scholars in the social scien-
ces and the humanities. Ato Sekyi-Otu has produced a highly cerebral book that will
arguably set in motion other areas of research that seek to position Africa as the center
of value. I will be revisiting how I think about Afropolitanism, my current area of
research, from this notion of universalism.
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“A Surreal World”: Enigmatic Hermeneutics and the Ethical Turn in Left
Universalism, Africacentric Essays
Ato Sekyi-Otu’s Left Universalism, Africacentric Essays poses a provocative question: is it
possible to outline an African universalist metaethical system based on the preexisting
structures of African social, political, and economic life? In this book, Sekyi-Otu addresses
this possibility and traces a universal system of values that has its origins in the local,
indigenous practices of African peoples but that is, a priori, transcultural in its scope. In
spite of its rather modest title, it mounts a methodical and often times polemical defense
of universalism and its attending family of concepts with an emphasis on the culture and
values of Africa as a postcolonial space. The text’s mission is ambitious, and at times the
exposition a bit unwieldy, but Sekyi-Otu’s theoretical breadth, which encompasses a vast
archive of philosophy, political science, sociology, postcolonial studies, Marxism, critical
theory, and literary studies, is marshalled towards a radical act of retrieval—the left
retrieval of universalism—in order to theorize a new foundationalism capable of address-
ing the realities of postcolonial life. Sekyi-Otu’s “visionary foundationalism” (26) seeks to
uncover the preexisting universalism which undergirds the African ethical life, to combat
the view that universalism and its attendant concepts are merely an “imperialist
Eurocentric hoax” (viii) imported to the Continent. Further, the book underscores the
necessity of this kind of foundationalist ethical positioning in any radical, future-oriented
politics, thus reviving and recasting debates within and about African socialism from the
1950s and 1960s. Addressing his defense to both the Western academic modes of ethical
thinking grounded in Rortyan anti-foundationalism and postcolonial schools of thought
stemming from deconstruction, Sekyi-Otu underlines the necessity of (re)turning to a
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moral realism grounded in the particularities of postcolonial African life and the shared
ethical values which emanate from it.
This retrieval itself is Africacentric in that it acknowledges what Sekyi-Otu refers
to as a “homemade” metacritical principle, arguing that “indigenous ethical judgments
are always already universalizing in their justificatory grounds, inescapably humanist
in their critical vocabulary” (18). Thus, he proposes the “possibility of a metalanguage
of assertion and justification of moral claims” which is “indigenous in its provenance
and ‘semantic resources,’ bears the marks of historical contingency and cultural con-
text, and yet is transcultural in its presuppositions and consequences” (20). Within
these indigenous practices and culturally specific ethical metalanguages, Sekyi-Otu
discerns the humanist impulse of universalism, defined as “the criticism or vindica-
tion of an arrangement and a convention, an idea and a practice, an event and an
action: the justification or confutation of a moral assertion and a claim, a belief and a
principle, in the inquiring name of the human and human universals” (3).
Thus, Sekyi-Otu looks to proverbs as one useful form of ethical thinking around
which the arguments of the book accumulate, like the Akan proverb from which the
first chapter derives its name: “Is She Not Also a Human Being?” Coupled with this
Africacentric philosophical archive, the book produces a thorough metacritical
analysis of Western and African academic conversations in universalist ethics.
Sekyi-Otu’s erudition and synthetic abilities are remarkable—there are 196
footnotes in the first chapter alone—and his readings of scholarship with which he
disagrees seemed always to be generous and faithful. However, this vast theoretical
archive can result in, at times, overlooking the contexts and conversations which
his many references participate in. For instance, Sekyi-Otu suggests that the ethical
musing of Sam Harris offers a “nuanced version of moral realism as a general
proposition” (52n143). However, while Harris’s The Moral Landscape appears to be
an objective, disinterested probing of the role of science in ethical thinking, indeed
suggesting science as the basis for moral realism, it quickly becomes apparent that
belying Harris’s interest in science’s neutrality is nothing more than a kind of
pedantic, sophomoric rationalism borne of the same Enlightenment universalism that
spurred European imperialism.1
Sekyi-Otu’s reference to Harris speaks more, I think, to a dearth of reasoned
and ethically-sound forays into articulating and retrieving the notion of universal-
ism2 and ultimately lends credence to the text’s guiding heuristic of uncovering
regionally- and ideologically-inflected universalist perspectives that do not col-
lapse under their own contradictions. The final chapter, “Enigmas and Proverbs,”
proposes what I find to be the text’s most compelling contribution; in it, Sekyi-
Otu outlines a mode of reading that returns to the “visionary foundationalism”
proposed in “Is She Not Also a Human Being?” Based on the formal properties of
proverbs, their performative exchange and open-endedness, the chapter offers a
hermeneutic of enigmatic reading, a mode of interpretation which attends to the
particularities of African reality: “Homeland of the brutal enigma and its twin,
the absurd, in its most soul-corroding forms” (236). He sees in this enigma a
challenge: “Can contemporary African literary culture teach the world anything
about apprehensions of the human condition in history?” (236). The challenge
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has bested many critics of African literature who have disparaged it as too emi-
nently political and thus far too atomized and unapproachable. Sekyi-Otu sug-
gests that this myopic position arises out of a certain Western academic
perspective that does not see in the African world the “carnival, ecstasy of excess,
fortunate indeterminacy” that it finds in other postcolonial settings. Instead, “in
the actually existing lands from whose historical experience this affair of the
mind is allegedly distilled, the postcolonial condition reeks of the rancid odor of
this bitter earth and its products: determinate desolation and indeterminate
hope” (240).
It is around these two products—desolation and hope—that enigmatic reading, or
what the subheading calls the “Poetics of Real Enigmas,” orbits. Sekyi-Otu derives
this mode of reading from his comparative analysis of Ngugi wa Thiongo’s Petals of
Blood and Ayi Kweh Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born. Ngugi, he sug-
gests, confronts the turbulence caused in the wake of the end of formal colonization
with “a tradition of world-making, living evidences of shared understandings achieved
by dint of exacting praxis, the remembrance of things cultivated in concert by fore-
bears and contemporaries” (249; my emphasis). Therefore, while the crisis of how to
make a world out of the ashes of history in Petals of Blood is located in “the mystery
of things in social space,” Armah asks what happens to things in “historical and polit-
ical time, troubling questions of their identity, sameness or distinctness—temporal
evidences of difference—that sets in motion a sense of metaphysical wonder and pro-
vokes proverbs of the human condition” (250). One of the primary enigmatic qual-
ities Sekyi-Otu identifies in Armah’s novel is the tendency to represent time as
“deprived of its normal division into past, present and future, dispossessed of narrat-
able moments of beginning, middle and ending” (253). This dispossession results in
the monotonous procession of daily life, of the world made “indecipherable” and
“foundationless, despoiled of distinguishable forms and qualities after the fleeting iri-
descence of history” (265). Furthermore, this deprivation expresses the peculiar
“strangeness,” 3 in Tejumola Olaniyan’s formulation, of the African state, not as
atomized exception, an asterisk to an otherwise triumphant world capitalist order and
thus utterly elusive to the western reader, but in fact as expressing a central aspect of
human existence in a world seemingly devoid of meaning or justice.
For Sekyi-Otu, the proverb is a “vision of possibility” capable of representing just
such jarring contradictions (271). It is precisely that cultural form which both exposes
this strangeness and accepts its correlate instability as a moment of opportunity for
the “adamant refusal of ‘sure knowledge’ as the foundation of human self-under-
standing” (271). Proverbs emanate from the particular forms of social and cultural
exchange that such strangeness necessarily engenders in the lives of Africans; the
proverb form therefore operates in this enigmatic register through their rhetorical
openness. Sekyi-Out calls this the “teleopoeisis” of the proverb: “an invitation to the
infinite work of possibility” (273). Echoing his assertions about the universal nature
of ethical thinking in African contexts, he suggests that the proverb is capable of
addressing the indeterminacy of postcolonial existence, but that its refusal of
“metaphysical determinism” is what makes it such an attractive candidate as a basis
for interpreting an African universalist worldview (265). This is not simply a matter
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of finding an “ethnic peculiarity” or a “distinctive African commonality,” vulgar
anthropologisms that dismiss more than they explain (274). Rather, these are instan-
ces of “local universals” predicated upon the lived experiences of “postcolonial
humanity” which take shape in the proverbial form (274–75). While it may be the
case that the directive rhetoric of “metaphysical determinism,” the language of stabil-
ity and closure that African novels tend to resist, purports to assuage the daily drama
of “a world choking with harrowing and unfathomable mysteries,” for Sekyi-Otu the
“exacting enigma of the proverb,” its very mysteriousness, is the only possible riposte
to the “surreal world” of African life (274).
In conclusion, Sekyi-Otu’s enigmatic hermeneutic strikes me as Left Universalism’s
most compelling contribution, especially to conversations in literary studies, where
debates about distant/close and paranoid/reparative reading practices and the contin-
ued relevance of the very “sword of critique” itself have long riveted the field.4 The
enigmatic mode of reading does not seem to harbor the depth metaphor eschewed by
distant reading nor the antagonistic valences that critics of the hermeneutics of suspi-
cion attribute to criticism in the paranoid mode. This mode of reading does not seek
to unravel or penetrate the enigmatic, it welcomes its honest depiction and the
responses of people in their mundane and exceptional encounters with it. In Left
Universalism, enigmatic reading focuses particularly on proverbs because of the active
social life they experience: localized and particular responses to ethical questions that
contain certain universal conceptions about a shared humanity. But these proverbs
are simply one manifestation of cultural responses to the enigmatic quality of African
life, and Sekyi-Otu’s work impels literary critics to see African literature as addressing
more than the immediately local, national or even regional concerns that gave cause
to its specific content but as encompassing the whole human world of shared scarcity
and abundance.
Notes
1. For Harris’s close association between “science” as he conceives it and the
Enlightenment, see Pangburn Philosophy, “Sam Harris & Jordan Peterson – June 23,
2018,” YouTube, August 31, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼jey_CzIOfYE. For
his ethical reasoning with regards to US interventionism abroad, see Sam Harris, “The
Limits of Discourse.” Last modified May 1, 2015. https://samharris.org/the-limits-of-
discourse/#47.
2. I see kindred attempts, though by necessity more limited, in the materialist-oriented
literary criticism of, for instance, Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious: Narrative
as a Socially Symbolic Act, which Sekyi-Otu refers to often, and related texts like Nicholas
Brown’s Utopian Generations: The Political Horizon of Twentieth-Century Literature and
Jed Esty’s A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England.
3. Tejumola Olaniyan, “State and Culture in Africa: The Possibilities of Strangeness,” in
State and Culture in Postcolonial Africa: Enchantings (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2017), 5.
4. The most representative of these debates and the thinking they engender can be found in
Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015);
Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History (Brooklyn,
NY: Verso, 2005); Eve K. Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or,
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You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You,” in Touching Feeling:
Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
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1. I do seem (with Armah) to reject Big Time Teleology, only to replace it with
the story of “a society that is teleological at every point insofar as it is the result
of choice … suffusing every moment in the history of human society with its own
telos.” From unitary historical teleology to finite articulations of telos throughout
history; telos pluralized but telos all the same, a pluralistic teleology, so to speak.
Is my comrade exploiting the dual meanings of telos: telos as informing design and
telos as immanent goal or purpose? “The result of choice” may conceivably be called
telos in the first sense (I’d prefer to describe it as a constraining project (“project”
in the Sartrean sense) but probably not in the second?
2. Distinguishing between communism as capitalism’s consummation or patrimony
and communism as “the negation of capitalism”; or conversely put, capitalism
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